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PREVIEW: Vote Solar v. Montana Department of Public Service 
Regulation: Standards of Review for Decisions Under the Montana 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Lindsay A. Mullineaux* 
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in 
this matter on Wednesday, February 26, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. Ann B. Hill will likely appear for the 
Appellant, Northwestern Energy, and Justine W. Kraske or Zachary T. 
Rogola will likely appear for Cross-Appellant, Montana Public Service 
Commission. Jenny K. Harbine will likely appear for Appellees, Vote 
Solar and Montana Environmental Information Center, and Marie P. 
Barlow will likely appear for Appellee, Cypress Creek Renewables, 
LLC.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves the Montana Public Service Commission’s 
(“Commission”) implementation of federal and state laws designed to 
promote development of small, renewable energy facilities, which 
includes establishing the rates utility companies must pay for power 
generated by such facilities.1 The parties have extensively briefed the 
issue of whether the Commission reasonably established rates and 
contract terms for NorthWestern Energy’s (“NorthWestern”) purchases 
from certain small, renewable energy facilities in Montana.2  
However, the threshold issue for the Court is whether the district 
court exceeded the scope of judicial review in vacating and modifying 
the Commission’s decision.3 This case represents the first time the 
Commission has determined a solar capacity contribution rate, and the 
resolution of this case will impact development of and investment in 
independent solar farms in Montana.4 
 
* Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. 
1 Appellees’ Response Brief at 2, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation (Mont. Sep. 
30, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223); Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. 
Serv. Regulation (Mont. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223). 
2 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
3 Id. 
4 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation 
(Mont. Sep. 13, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223). 
74 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 80 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In Montana, utility purchases of energy from small energy 
production facilities are governed by state statutes implementing the 
federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”).5 PURPA was 
enacted in 1978 with the goal of encouraging development of renewable 
energy sources and reducing the nation’s dependence on any single 
energy source.6  PURPA requires utilities to purchase energy from 
qualifying small power production facilities—known as “qualifying 
facilities” or “QFs”—at rates that allow the QFs to become and remain 
economically viable.7 The utilities then recover the costs of these 
mandatory purchases directly from the consumer.8 Under PURPA, the 
rates “(1) shall be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the 
electric utility and in the public interest, and (2) shall not discriminate 
against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small power producers.”9 
Essentially, PURPA creates an “avoided cost standard,” where utilities 
must pay a rate for energy from QFs that reflects the costs the utilities 
would otherwise incur to develop or acquire generation capacity (i.e., 
capacity costs) and/or produce or purchase energy (i.e., energy costs).10 
The Commission is tasked with implementing PURPA.11 Under 
Montana law, the Commission is mandated to establish standard rates for 
the subset of very small QFs at issue in this case—those with capacity of 
3 megawatts or less.12 The Commission sets rates based on avoided costs, 
which includes calculating capacity contribution rates—a determination 
of the percentage QFs contribute of their overall generating capacity to 
NorthWestern’s needs.13 The Commission also sets contract terms and 
conditions.14 While the Commission has discretion in establishing these 
terms, the Montana Legislature has set forth a policy stating the 
Commission shall encourage long-term contracts to enhance the 
economic feasibility of QFs.15 Due to fluctuations in the market, 
Montana utilities file applications to update these standard rates every 
two years.16 
 
5 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2018). 
6 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3. 
9 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)). 
10 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 4.  
11 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3. 
12 Id. at 3–4. 
13 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 28. 
14 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
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The Commission last updated NorthWestern’s rates in 2014.17 On 
May 3, 2016, NorthWestern filed its biannual application with the 
Commission, which requested a significant decrease in standard rates for 
QFs.18 Also before the Commission was the issue of whether to reduce 
the maximum length of standard-offer contracts between Northwestern 
and the QFs.19 After conducting a hearing and reviewing the record, the 
Commission issued an order establishing off-peak rates at $25.37 (down 
from $53.14), peak rates at $34.47 (down from $92.73), and establishing 
a solar capacity contribution of 6.1% (previously undetermined).20 The 
order also lowered the maximum contract length from 25 years to 10 
years.21 Appellees moved for reconsideration.22 On reconsideration, the 
Commission affirmed its decision except with regard to maximum 
contract length, which was increased from 10 years to 15 years.23  
Concerned with the effect of the lowered rates on the economic 
viability of QFs, Appellees sought judicial review of the reconsidered 
order through the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”).24 
On April 2, 2019, Judge Manley of the Eight Judicial District Court, 
Cascade County, vacated and modified the Commission’s decisions, 
holding the Commission’s rate calculation was arbitrary and unlawful 
and the Commission’s reduction of standard-offer contract lengths was 
unsupported by the evidence.25 The decision was remanded to the 
Commission with instructions to direct NorthWestern to identify new 
standard rates and contract lengths consistent with the district court’s 
findings.26 NorthWestern and the Commission appealed.27 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Appellant’s and Cross-Appellant’s Arguments 
NorthWestern, Appellant, and the Commission, Cross-Appellant, 
(collectively “Appellants”) each argue the Commission’s rate and 
contract length decisions were reasonable, supported by evidence, and 
 
17 Id. at 5.  
18 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 7. 
19 Id. at 8. 
20 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 8, 18. 
21 Id. at 18. 
22 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 9. 
23 Id. at 10. 
24 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 17; see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2–4–101 to 
2–4–711 (2019). 
25 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 10; Order Vacating and Modifying Montana Public 
Service Commission Order Nos. 7500c and 7500d at 1, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv. 
Regulation (Mont. Apr. 2, 2019) (No. BVD-17-0776) [hereinafter Order]. 
26 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
27 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3. 
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consistent with federal and state law.28 Appellants contend the 
Commission correctly applied the historically used proxy method to 
establish Northwestern’s avoided energy and capacity costs.29 Appellants 
claim that, in applying this established method, the Commission 
correctly revised NorthWestern’s avoided energy costs based on updated 
market price forecasts without utilizing a carbon adjustment.30  
 
Appellants further contend the Commission correctly applied the 
industry-standard exceedance analysis, the same method utilized by 
Southwest Power Pool (“SSP”), which oversees the electric grid and 
wholesale power market in the central United States, to set the solar 
capacity contribution at 6.1%.31 Regarding contract length, Appellants 
assert the 15-year maximum contract term is sufficient to support QF 
project development.32 Appellants hone in on the fact that Montana 
public policy requires the Commission “to enhance the economic 
feasibility”;33 therefore, “the policy is not to make financing guaranteed 
at specified terms, but to make financing of the QF project possible.”34 In 
sum, Appellants maintain the Commission’s decisions were the result of 
correct applications of the proxy method and the exceedance analysis and 
adequately balanced the needs of QFs with both the interests of utilities 
and the interests of consumers.35 
 
Appellants further contend that, while the district court has 
jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, the district court exceeded 
the scope of judicial review by taking on “the legislative function of 
ratemaking.”36 Appellants maintain Judge Manley overstepped by 
disregarding the Commission’s technical expertise and fact finding 
responsibilities37 and erred in vacating and modifying the Commission’s 
decisions rather than remanding the decisions to the Commission for 
further proceedings.38 Additionally, Appellants insist the district court 
incorrectly applied the standard of review for informal agency 
proceedings, which evaluates whether decisions are “arbitrary, 
capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence,” rather 
than the standard of review for contested proceedings, which typically 
 
28 Id. at 22; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
29 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10. 
30 Id. at 10, 13. 
31 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8. 
32 Id. at 17. 
33 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 69–3–604(2) 
(2019)) (“Long term contracts . . . must be encouraged in order to enhance the economic feasibility 
of qualifying small power production facilities”). 
34 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17. 
35 Id. at 10–11. 
36 Id. at 20. 
37 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 21. 
38 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20. 
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involves a substantial evidence standard for findings of fact and a de 
novo standard for conclusions of law.39 Appellants stress that, in 
reviewing Commission decisions, courts should continue to adhere to 
these well-established standards of review and refrain from incorporating 
new principles.40 
B. Appellees’ Arguments 
Vote Solar, Montana Environmental Information Center, and 
Cypress Creek Renewables, LLC (collectively “Appellees”) contend the 
district court correctly held the Commission’s rate and contract lengths 
were arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful.41 Appellees assert the 
Commission did not fairly compensate solar energy resources for energy 
generated.42 Appellees specifically argue the Commission failed to 
accurately compensate QFs for avoided costs by excluding from 
calculations future regulatory costs associated with carbon dioxide 
emissions that NorthWestern avoids by purchasing energy from non-
carbon emitting QFs.43  
 
Further, Appellees contend the Commission’s application of the 
proxy method was arbitrary and unlawful because it failed to fully 
compensate QFs for the operating costs of new resources NorthWestern 
planned to construct in 2019.44 Moreover, Appellees assert the 
Commission’s application of the SSP methodology in calculating the 
solar capacity contribution arbitrarily focused on a handful of infrequent 
and short-lived peak demand hours in the winter, where solar farms 
contributed less to NorthWestern’s system capacity, thereby overlooking 
regional demand and solar contributions in the summer months, where 
customer demand also peaks.45  
 
Finally, Appellees argued the Commission unjustifiably reduced the 
maximum duration of contracts from 25 years to 15 years.46 Here, 
Appellees highlight the interplay between the contract length and rates, 
asserting that 15-year contracts, particularly in light of the combined 
impact resulting from the Commission’s decision to drastically reduce 
rates, are insufficiently long-term to “enhance the economic feasibility” 
of qualifying facilities as required by Montana law.47 
 
 
39 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
40 Id. at 39. 
41 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 14. 
42 Id. at 16. 
43 Id. at 24. 
44 Id. at 25. 
45 Id. at 28–30. 
46 Id. at 35. 
47 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 69–3–604(2)). 
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Appellees maintain the district court applied the correct standard of 
review and provided an appropriate remedy under Montana law.48 
Appellees assert the Commission’s decision is controlled by Montana 
Code Annotated § 69-3-402; therefore, the Commission’s decision must 
be set aside where it is “unlawful or unreasonable.”49 In addition, 
Appellees stress courts “may reverse or modify [the Commission’s] 
decision” if it is, among other things, “in violation of … statutory 
provisions,” “clearly erroneous,” or “arbitrary or capricious.”50 Because 
agency action is arbitrary if the agency fails to consider relevant factors, 
including the standards and purposes of the statutes the agency 
administers, Appellees contend the district court correctly modified the 
Commission’s decisions.51   
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Montana Supreme Court applies the same standards of review 
that a district court applies in reviewing Commission decisions.52 Thus, 
the Court is immediately faced with this threshold issue. While the 
parties agree the Court must apply the standards of review set forth in 
MAPA, the parties disagree on the practical application of such 
standards. 
 
Appellants urge the Court to distinguish standards of review in 
contested case decisions, i.e., MAPA decisions, from those in used in 
informal agency decisions, i.e., non-MAPA decisions.53 Appellants cite 
to NorthWestern Corporation v. Montana Department of Public Service 
Regulation54 as support for this proposition.55 In NorthWestern 
Corporation, the Court explained “[a] district court reviews an 
administrative decision in a contested case to determine whether the 
agency’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its 
interpretation of the law is correct.”56 The case further stands for 
Appellants’ assertion that “findings of fact are clearly erroneous if (1) 
they are not supported by substantial record evidence; (2) if supported, 
whether the Commission nonetheless misapprehended the effect of the 
evidence; and (3) if supported and not misapprehended, this Court is left 
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”57 
 
48 Id. at 43.  
49 Id. at 11. 
50 Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)). 
51 Id. at 12–13. 
52 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10. 
53 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
54 380 P.3d 787 (Mont. 2016). 
55 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39. 
56 380 P.3d at 793–94 (quoting Williamson v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 272 P.3d 71, 81 (Mont. 
2012)). 
57 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39; see also Northwestern, 380 P.3d at 793–94 
(quoting Williamson, 272 P.3d at 81). 
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Appellants argue that these “well-established standards” are 
distinguishable from informal agency decisions, which the Court reviews 
on an “arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial 
evidence” standard.58 However, Appellants’ attempt to distinguish 
MAPA decisions from non-MAPA decisions is plagued by the fact that 
NorthWestern Corporation acknowledges that, under MAPA, “the court 
may reverse or modify the agency decision if the ‘substantial rights’ of 
the appellant were prejudiced because the administrative findings are . . . 
‘arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly 
unwarranted exercise of discretion.’”59 MAPA does not preclude use of 
an arbitrary standard; on the contrary, MAPA expressly enumerates it.60 
 
In contrast, Appellees, relying on Montana Code Annotated § 2–4–
704(2), assert the “arbitrary or capricious” standard applicable in MAPA 
decisions is interchangeable from the “arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or 
not supported by substantial evidence” standard employed in non-MAPA 
cases.61 Appellees further urge the Court to adopt the factor analysis set 
forth in Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality,62 a non-MAPA case.63 In Clark Fork Coalition, the Court held 
“in examining whether an agency decision applying a regulation was 
arbitrary or capricious, the courts consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment.”64 Certainly, the specific language of 
Clark Fork Coalition limits the holding to non-MAPA decisions by 
stating “[w]e review an agency decision not classified as a contested case 
under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act to determine whether 
the decision was ‘arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by 
substantial evidence.’”65 However, the Court has already extended 
MAPA standards in similar areas, such as by applying MAPA’s standard 
of review extensively to local government decisions.66 Practically 
speaking, the substantial overlap in language between the two standards 
suggests implementation of the factor test may be appropriate under 
MAPA.   
 
It is anticipated that the Court will find the district court was within 
its authority to vacate and modify the Commission decisions as arbitrary 
 
58 Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
59 380 P.3d at 794 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(ii)–(vi) (2019)). 
60 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(vi). 
61 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 13. 
62 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008).  
63 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 13. 
64 197 P.3d at 488.  
65 Id. at 487 (quoting Johansen v. State, 983 P.2d 962, 965 (Mont. 1999)).  
66 Community Assoc. for North Shore Conservation, Inc. v. Flathead Cty, 445 P.3d 1195, 1204 
(Mont. 2019); see also Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 230 P.3d 808 (Mont. 2010); Kiely 
Constr. LLC v. City of Red Lodge, 57 P.3d 836 (Mont. 2002). 
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without needing to address implementation of the factor test for MAPA 
decisions. Under Montana Code Annotated § 2-4-704(2), the district 
court has the right to reverse or modify the Commission’s decision if 
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the 
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are: (i) in 
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (ii) in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency; (iii) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(iv) affected by other error of law; (v) clearly erroneous in view of the 
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (vi) 
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly 
unwarranted exercise of discretion.67  
 
The district court’s order addresses the Commission’s decisions 
through these frameworks, holding: (1) the Commission lacked 
substantial evidence necessary to determine 15-year contracts are 
significantly long-term, as a majority of Commissioners admitted the 
evidentiary record on this issue was inadequate; (2) the Commission 
acted arbitrarily in in departing from the recent Commission practice of 
including avoided carbon costs in QF rates without providing any 
explanation; and (3) the Commission acted arbitrarily in setting the solar 
capacity contribution at 6.1% because it discounted record evidence 
demonstrating NorthWestern’s substantial summertime capacity needs, 
as evidenced by the fact that NorthWestern’s summer peak demand 
exceeded winter peak demand in nearly half of the years evaluated.68  
 
Should the Court determine the standard of review principles for 
MAPA and non-MAPA cases are interchangeable, the Court is even 
more likely to affirm the district court’s decision based on the 
Commission’s failure to consider relevant factors, such as whether the 
agency adequately considered the factors relevant to choosing a rate that 
will best serve the purposes of the underlying statutes. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This case offers the Montana Supreme Court an opportunity to 
clarify the similarly worded doctrines of MAPA and non-MAPA 
standards of review. While the case may be resolved on the merits 
without reaching this issue, Montana law would benefit from 
clarification in this area. As the case involves a matter of first impression 
regarding the solar capacity contribution rates, the Court’s holding will 
affect utilities; existing small, renewable energy facilities; developers 
and investors; and consumers residing in Montana. 
 
67 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(vi) (2019). 
68 Order, supra note 25, at 6, 9–10, 12. 
